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The international community is nowhere near using the full range of its military capabilities and the UK
Commons Defence Committee was right yesterday to call on the UK government to do more in the
fight against ISIS, writes Ranj Alaaldin. With momentum shifting against the group, ISIS must not be
allowed to repair and rebuild.
Twenty-one key countries leading the fight against the Islamic Sate of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) convened
two weeks ago in London. Writing in The Telegraph, UK Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond stated at
the time that they have convened to “use the full range of our diplomatic and military capabilities to
bring together an international coalition to step up our response to international terrorism and the
threat it poses to our collective security.”
But the international community is nowhere near using the full range of its military capabilities and the UK Commons
Defence Committee was right yesterday to call on the UK government to do more in the fight against ISIS. Six
months after the US conducted its airstrikes on ISIS targets, the international community is still yet to utilise its
military capacity to full effect.
The momentum is certainly shifting against ISIS. It suffered defeat last week in Kobane at the hands of Syrian
Kurdish forces and continues to suffer losses and casualties in Iraq as a result of the US-led air campaign and at the
hands of the Iraqi armed forces, Shi’a paramilitary groups as well as the Kurdish Peshmerga. However, ISIS must
not be allowed to repair and rebuild. It must not be given the breathing space that allows it to re-group and re-
consolidate its grip. The jihadists have intimidated and eliminated rivals but those rivals are increasing, as is local
discontent. This must be capitalised on.
ISIS’ decline is further evidenced by the survival of the Iraqi state. Against the odds and widespread anticipation last
year in June, when ISIS took Mosul, Iraq’s second city, the Iraqi state has not disintegrated. This is bad news for
ISIS. Iraq’s survival is tantamount to defeat for the jihadists. As a transnational organisation that functions on the
basis of territory and resources from both Syria and Iraq, defeating the group in Iraq will undermine it in Syria and
continue to shift the momentum against the group.
Iraq is crucial for ISIS because it prides itself on its control of territory stretching between Syria and Iraq. Upon
taking Mosul last year in June, ISIS then declared a Caliphate; it projected an aura of invincibility that suggested it
could bring down borders at will, allowing it to portray itself as a force for the future and swell its ranks with local and
international recruits.
In other words, ISIS’ control of Iraqi territory became a symbol of its prowess and central to the organisation’s ability
to sustain itself, expand and promote its brand of radical Islam. However, ISIS has been unable to expand its
territory in Iraq since last year. In addition to suffering heavy losses, ISIS is also suffering because sectarian
polarisation is decreasing in Iraq, thanks to Iraq’s new government and the leadership of its new premier, Haider al-
Abadi, who has been lauded for not exacerbating sectarian tensions. This is worrying for ISIS as it has emerged
from, and thrives on, sectarianism.
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The Iraqi prime minister, Haider al-Abadi flanked by UK foreign secretary Philip Hammond and US secretary
of state John Kerry
Recent Iraqi history proves that hitting ISIS harder and intensifying the military campaign more generally works. It
worked in 2007 when a combination of US military personnel – injected into Iraq as part of what became known as
“the surge” and the “Sunni Awakening” – paved the way for Sunni Arab tribal cooperation and the Sunnis’ integration
into Iraq’s political process. Crucially, this came after the Sunni insurgency suffered heavy losses during its 2006
conflict with Iraq’s Shi’a community. It was forced into retreat after realising the new Iraq and its political process
was here to stay, as was the ascendancy of Iraq’s previously oppressed and marginalised Shi’a community.
Just as the Sunni insurgency was (of which ISIS is a re-branded version), ISIS can also be contained, forced to
disintegrate and then, eventually, eliminated. Its resilience requires a sustained military campaign, as opposed to a
half-hearted military effort.
The military campaign is one part of the solution but an important one as it makes clear the new Iraq and its political
order is here to stay. The other part requires, firstly, sustaining ongoing efforts toward reconciliation, the
reconstitution of the Iraqi army and integrating Iraq’s Shia paramilitary groups into the armed forces. Prime Minister
al-Abadi must stay true to his word and punish individuals and groups responsible for attacks, that includes Shia
groups responsible for recent sectarian attacks and massacres on Sunnis.
Secondly, Iraq’s Sunni actors who have fought and continue to fight ISIS must be empowered. They exist but lack
the resources and support to challenge ISIS. There is the concern that providing them with weapons and resources
could work against the Iraqi government in the future. That, however, is a risk that might have to be taken as,
ultimately, it is Iraqis and Iraqis alone that can, through a concerted effort, defeat ISIS and save the Iraqi state.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog, nor of the
London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting. 
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